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Abstract: Microorganisms have been cooperating with
each other for billions of years: by sharing resources,
communicating with each other, and joining together to
form biofilms and other large structures. These coopera-
tive behaviors benefit the colony as a whole; however,
they may be costly to the individuals performing them.
This raises the question of how such cooperation can arise
from natural selection. Mathematical modeling is one
important avenue for exploring this question. Evolution-
ary experiments are another, providing us with an
opportunity to see evolutionary dynamics in action and
allowing us to test predictions arising from mathematical
models. A new study in this issue of PLOS Biology
investigates the evolution of a cooperative resource-
sharing behavior in yeast. Examining the competition
between cooperating and ‘‘cheating’’ strains of yeast, the
authors find that, depending on the initial mix of strains,
this yeast society either evolves toward a stable coexis-
tence or collapses for lack of cooperation. Using a simple
mathematical model, they show how these dynamics arise
from eco-evolutionary feedback, where changes in the
frequencies of strains are coupled with changes in
population size. This study and others illustrate the
combined power of modeling and experiment to
elucidate the origins of cooperation and other funda-
mental questions in evolutionary biology.
How much cooperation does it take to maintain a society?
Many biological populations, from microbes to insects to humans,
depend on the cooperation of their members in order to access
resources, raise offspring, and avoid danger. Yet in any
cooperative activity, there is the risk of ‘‘cheaters,’’ who benefit
from the generosity of others while making no contribution of their
own. Consider, for example, the layabout in a communal
household who refuses to cook or clean dishes. If this cheating
behavior spreads through the population, the society as a whole
may collapse.
Evolutionary biologists since Darwin have been fascinated by
how populations can overcome this dilemma. Studying this
question can be challenging. While the products of evolution are
evident in the natural world, the process that produced them is
mostly hidden from view. As a consequence, direct observation of
the evolution of cooperation in action is often limited.
Much of our current understanding of this conundrum arises
from mathematical modeling. Ever since the birth of population
genetics about a century ago, it has been recognized that the
theory of evolution can be set upon exact mathematical
foundations. This approach has flourished ever since, and
especially in the last few decades. The theory of choice to study
social phenomena is evolutionary game theory [1–5], in which
behaviors that affect others are represented as strategies. Simple
mathematical models describe the dynamics of these strategies
under mutation and selection, depending on the population
structure [6–12]. Applied to the problem of cooperation, these
models show that if a cooperating individual receives some of the
benefit of his or her own labors—as in Snowdrift games or some
nonlinear public goods games—then evolutionary dynamics may
lead to an equilibrium in which cooperators and cheaters coexist
[1,13]. On the other hand, if benefits accrue only to others—as in
Prisoners’ Dilemma games—then cooperation is expected to
disappear unless some mechanism is present to support it [14].
Recently, experiments with microbes have afforded us an
unprecedented opportunity to observe evolution in action [15–20].
Bacteria, yeast, and other single-celled organisms divide rapidly
enough that evolutionary change—the arrival and fixation of
beneficial mutations—can be observed in the laboratory. More-
over, the experimenter is able to control the population size,
environmental conditions, and other variables, and can therefore
test hypotheses regarding how the course of evolution depends on
these variables. Experimenters can also preserve specimens of the
population from all phases of its evolution as a ‘‘living record’’ of
genotypic and phenotypic change. In short, experiments with
microbes are a powerful tool for testing evolutionary hypotheses.
Microorganism experiments hold particular promise for shed-
ding light on how cooperative behaviors emerge from evolution
[21–26]. Microbial species cooperate in a variety of ways: They
form biofilms, produce iron-scavenging agents, produce chemicals
to resist antibiotics, and form fruiting bodies when local resources
are depleted. By mixing wild-type strains that display a particular
cooperative behavior with ‘‘cheater’’ mutants that do not,
researchers can test hypotheses about what conditions favor
wild-type ‘‘cooperators’’ over cheaters.
In one such experiment, Gore et al. [26] studied a social
dilemma in the yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae. The preferred nutrient
sources for this yeast are the simple sugars glucose and fructose;
however, it can subsist on the compound sugar sucrose by
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glucose and fructose. A crucial point is that, since this reaction
occurs near the cell wall, only about 1% of these simple sugars are
captured by the cell in which they are produced. The remaining
99% diffuse away and are available to other cells. Thus producing
invertase is a cooperative behavior, with the bulk of the benefit
going to cells other than the producer. Moreover, this cooperation
is costly, in that the production of invertase carries a metabolic cost
to the producer. To study the evolution of this behavior, Gore et
al. created cheater strains that do not produce invertase, and
thereby avoid the associated cost. Letting these strains compete
with each other, they found that, in most cases, cooperator and
cheater strains converged to an equilibrium in which both strains
coexisted—a result consistent with theoretical predictions regard-
ing Snowdrift games and nonlinear public goods games [1,13].
Much theoretical work on the evolution of cooperation and
other traits has assumed, for the sake of simplicity, that the
population size remains roughly constant while the strains in
question are competing. However, it is entirely possible that
population dynamics—changes in population size—may occur on the
same timescale as evolutionary dynamics—changes in the frequencies
of competing types. In this case, these two dynamical processes
may affect one another, a phenomenon known as eco-evolutionary
feedback [27–30]. Mathematical modeling has shown that eco-
evolutionary feedback may lead to a variety of complex dynamical
behaviors, including multiple equilibria, cycling, chaos, and
Turing patterns [28,30–33].
In this issue of PLOS Biology, Sanchez and Gore [34] have—for
the first time, to our knowledge—empirically demonstrated eco-
evolutionary feedback in the evolution of cooperation. Using the
yeast system described above, the authors studied the coupled
dynamics of the population density and the proportion of
cooperator types within the population. The mechanism for eco-
evolutionary feedback in this system is intuitive: the growth of the
population as a whole depends on the concentration of simple
sugars, which in turn depends on the density of cooperators. If
there are insufficient cooperators, the overall population density
declines. With low population density, cooperators have an
advantage due to the simple sugars they manage to retain for
themselves. At this point, cooperators increase in frequency, and
the concentration of simple sugars increases, leading to overall
population growth. But once this happens, cheaters proliferate
faster than cooperators due to their lower metabolic costs. This in
turn depresses the frequency of cooperators, and the cycle repeats
itself. We would therefore expect to see cycling or spiraling
behavior in the eco-evolutionary dynamics of these types,
consistent with theoretical predictions [32,33].
In their experiment, Sanchez and Gore observed not only
spiraling, but also bistability—the presence of two equilibria to
which the system might converge, depending on the initial
conditions [35]. If the initial population density and/or the initial
proportion of cooperators is too low, not enough simple sugars are
produced and the population collapses. On the other hand, if there
are sufficiently many cooperators in the initial population, the
population converges in spiraling fashion to an equilibrium in
which population density is high and cooperators and cheaters
coexist (Figure 1). To complement their experiment, the authors
developed a simple Lotka-Volterra–type model describing the
interdependent growth of the competing strains. This model
reproduces the observed eco-evolutionary dynamics with remark-
able fidelity, given its simplicity.
Interestingly, the proportion of cooperators in the coexistence
equilibrium is low—less than 10%—but is nonetheless sufficient
to maintain the viability of the population. Does the predom-
inance of cheaters in this equilibrium hurt the population as a
whole? The authors found that the overall density and
productivity of the population in the coexistence equilibrium is
not much less than what cooperators would achieve in the
absence of cheaters. However, the predominance of cheaters
does impact the population’s resilience to an ecological shock—
in this case, rapid and significant dilution of the population.
Cooperators in monomorphic equilibrium survive this shock, but
populations in mixed equilibrium between cooperators and
cheaters do not. In short, mixed populations are comparably
productive to, but significantly less resilient than, cooperator-
only populations.
The study of Sanchez and Gore illustrates the synergistic power
of theory and experiment when carefully combined. The opportu-
nities for further such combinations are immense. Population
genetics and evolutionary game theory have provided us with a
wealth of testable hypotheses about evolution, and we now have the
experimental technology to test them. Some of the most interesting
hypotheses regard the effect of spatial structure on the evolution of
cooperation. Well-known results in evolutionary game theory show
that spatial structure can promote cooperation [6,36–39], though
thiseffectdependsstronglyonthedetailsofspatialreproductionand
replacement [40]. Thus far, experimental studies have addressed
this question only indirectly, with reduced pathogen virulence
representing an indirect form of cooperation [41], or with group
subdivision standing in for spatial structure [22,23]. The effects of
spatial structure on the evolution of cooperation in microbial
colonies remains an important open question.
At the same time, we must also allow experimental results to
inform the development of new mathematical models. The field of
social bacterial evolution requires well-defined, simple models that
describe how populations of bacteria change over time, taking into
account the reproductive events, social interactions, and population
structures particular to these populations. This approach ultimately
brings together the methods of population genetics, evolutionary
game theory, ecology, and experimental microbiology.
Figure 1. Dynamics of eco-evolutionary feedback in cooperator
and cheater strains of the yeast S. cerevisiae, as observed in the
experiment of Sanchez and Gore. There are two basins of
attraction, with a different outcome expected from each. If there are
too few cooperators to start, not enough simple sugars are produced
and the population collapses. On the other hand, if the initial number of
cooperators is sufficient, the system converges in spiraling fashion to an
equilibrium in which cooperators and cheaters coexist.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001549.g001
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